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SLAVERY, FREE BLACKS AND CITIZENSHIP 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
The Constitution and the Sectional Conflict 
Rutgers University School of Law-Camden 
Camden, New Jersey, Aprill2, 2011 
"Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take 
you in." 
-Robert Frost, The Death ofthe Hired Man (1915) 
"Membership has its privileges." 
-American Express advertisement 
"In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American." 
-Justice Scalia, concurring, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 239 (1995) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The most nettlesome issue in American constitutional law in the days 
surrounding the Civil War, before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
may have been how to address the status of native-born free blacks. The core 
issue was whether free blacks should be treated as free people who should be 
fully included in the polity or as the equivalent of free slaves who should not 
be fully included in the polity. The liberty and equality embodied in the 
Constitution suggest that free people who have aligned themselves with the 
American republic should be eligible to become citizens and members of the 
American polity. However, that was not necessarily true of free blacks in the 
. 
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days preceding the Civil War. That may not be surprising to some 
considering that the Constitution tolerated race-based slavery. A society that 
accepted slavery may have been unwilling to guarantee the acceptance of 
free people who bore the racial mark of slavery. However, American society 
was bound to address those issues again during the Civil War and its 
aftermath. 
This brief essay focuses on whether and how the historical exclusion and 
subsequent inclusion of free blacks in the American polity reflects the 
substance of American citizenship. It considers what the formal exclusion of 
free blacks as citizens before the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments 
says about American citizenship and what the formal inclusion of free blacks 
as citizens through the Reconstruction Amendments says about the nature of 
American citizenship. The essay is organized as follows. Part I of the essay 
explores citizenship and membership by discussing belonging-based 
citizenship and rights-based citizenship. Part II describes how American and 
African American citizenship were constructed prior to the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Part III notes a few cases to explain how the 
Reconstruction Amendment's jurisprudence has developed in the wake of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford' and possibly led to a tilt toward a rights-based 
citizenship rather than a somewhat more robust belonging-based citizenship. 
II. CITIZENSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP 
A. Rights and Belonging 
The content of American citizenship is elusive. Citizenship suggests 
being an equal member and full participant in a nation or polity.2 However, 
I. 60 u.s. 393 (1857). 
2. This has helped define citizenship for a long time. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 
162, 165-66 (1875) (noting that citizenship is membership in a nation); DAVID J. BREWER, 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12 (1905) (viewing citizenship and membership in a nation or tribe as 
interchangeable); BERNARD P. DAUENHAUER, CITIZENSHIP IN A FRAGILE WORLD I (1996) 
(linking citizenship and community membership); LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1934) ("Citizenship, then, is membership in a nation or state[.]"); 
DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP I (2008) ("Citizenship, 
which may be defined as equal membership of a political community from which enforceable 
rights and obligations, benefits and resources, participatory practices and a sense of identity 
flow, affects everyone."); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 4 (1991) ("Citizenship 
as nationality is the legal recognition, both domestic and international, that a person is a 
member, native-born or naturalized, of a state."); JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP 3 ( 1905) ("[T]he term citizen, as it is commonly understood, implies membership 
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citizenship and membership are fluid concepts. 3 They can be fuzzy concepts 
because they can be conceptualized in many different ways.4 Both entail 
rights and responsibilities that accompany being a part of an organization or 
entity. Citizenship and membership may be structured merely as a formal set 
of rights owed to the member by an organization accompanied by a formal 
set of obligations owed by the member to the organization. 5 This rights-
based membership may be the least robust, but most definitive vision of 
citizenship and membership. Conversely, membership may be based on the 
more general notion of belonging to the organization in which one has 
membership.6 Belonging may bring formal rights and obligations. However, 
it may also include fuzzy rights and fuzzy obligations to the other members 
in the organization and to the organization itselC That is, citizenship and 
membership can be thought to define a relationship in which the citizen 
belongs to the community and is treated colloquially as "one of us." This 
vision of membership is arguably more robust than the mere rights-and-
of a political body in which the individual enjoys popular liberty to a greater or less degree. It 
does not necessarily follow from this definition, that the grade or quality or privileges of 
citizenship must be identical in all citizens, even in republican governments."). 
3. See Pauline Maier, Nationhood and Citizenship: What Difference Did the American 
Revolution Make?, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 45-47 (1996) ("[l)n exploring that subject, 
it is important to understand that the words 'nation' and 'citizen' have changed in meaning 
over time."); NOELLE MCAFEE, HABERMAS, I<RJSTEVA, & CITIZENSHIP 13 (2000) (discussing 
how the meaning of citizen has changed over time); SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 9 ("I also want 
to remind political theorists that citizenship is not a notion that can be discussed intelligibly in 
a static and empty social space .... Citizenship has changed over the years[.]"). 
4. Citizenship subsumes many components that can be structured in various ways. See 
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 20 (2006) ("Thus, status, rights, political 
engagement, and identity together define the contours of our contemporary understandings of 
citizenship as membership."). 
5. See DAUENHAUER, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that citizenship "confers entitlements 
and immunities and imposes obligations"); McAFEE, supra note 3, at 13 (noting that rights 
and obligations attend citizenship). 
6. I borrow the notion of belonging from Kenneth Karst. See generally KENNETH L. 
KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA (I 989). Others have similarly considered the notion of 
belonging. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 945, 946 (2005) ("The focus of this essay is on 
what Professor Denise Morgan and I call 'Rights of Belonging,' those rights that promote an 
inclusive vision of who belongs to the national community and that facilitate equal 
membership in that community."). 
7. See Noah M.J. Pickus, "Hearken Not to the Unnatural Voice": Pub/ius and the 
Artifice of Attachment, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 63 (I 996) ("Membership in the 
American polity is not, ·however, solely a matter of formal textual provisions governing 
eligibility and rights. United State citizenship also encompasses a notion of belonging to a 
political community."). 
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obligations vision of membership, but is less defined. 8 Rather than providing 
a determinate way to define citizenship, using membership as a lens provides 
a range of possible definitions of citizenship. The different 
conceptualizations of citizenship can lead to very different citizenship 
experiences for various citizens and can affect the type of society that is 
created. 
A rights-and-obligations-based vision of citizenship may or may not be a 
particularly fulfilling one, though it may be a quite definitive version of 
citizenship. Legal rights and obligations may be explicitly defined and one 
may be a good citizen merely by abiding by the citizenship "contract."9 
However, the relationship between citizen and community and among 
citizens may become an arm's length relationship that is viewed not as a 
mutually reinforcing relationship, but as an relationship of convenience. 
Indeed, entry and exit from the relationship may be based purely on the 
tangible value of the association. For example, the confederate states were 
members of the Union, but believed that voluntary exit from the Union was 
or should have been allowed once the value of the relationship had 
diminished. 10 
A belonging-based citizenship may be indefinite, but quite fulfilling. 11 
Citizens will have rights and obligations under this construction of 
citizenship. However, the nature of belonging may trigger somewhat 
uncertain moral rights and obligations in addition to reasonably clear legal 
rights and obligations that flow from formal citizenship. 12 Bonds of 
belonging may tend to create mutually reinforcing and beneficial 
8. See Nathan Glazer, Reflections on Citizenship and Diversity, in DIVERSITY AND 
CITIZENSHIP 85, 86 (1996) ("[S]omething more seems to be needed, aside from native birth, 
no accent, and presumed American citizenship, to be considered by a stranger a full American. 
The formal and informal indications of full citizenship and membership are insufficient."). 
9. See Daniel Kanstroom, Alien Litigation As Polity-Participation: The Positive Power 
of a "Voteless Class Of Litigants", 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 407 (2012) (suggesting 
that citizenship is narrower than general membership in a polity, and may be constructed 
around rights and obligations); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Mission Dissonance in the TANF 
Program: Of Work. Self-Sufficiency, Reciprocity, and the Work Participation Rate, 6 HARV. L. 
& PoL'Y REV. 369, 375 (20 12) (discussing a rights and obligations vision of citizenship). 
10. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 267 (1995) (discussing secession of 
southern states prior to Civil War); EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION 1861-
1865, at 41-43(1979) (discussing secession). 
I I. Belonging can spur society-enhancing behavior. See Pickus, supra note 7, at 64 
("Citizens have to regard belonging as itself important if talk of civic virtue is to find an 
attentive audience."). 
12. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 6---11 (noting that the law does not catalog or enforce 
all of the moral duties and obligations that parties owe to one another in a relationship). 
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relationships between and among the citizen, fellow citizens and the 
community. This belonging-based citizenship is fluid and unclear, but may 
be more robust from the citizen's perspective than the rights-based version of 
citizenship. It is a conception of citizenship that may firmly tie the citizen to 
the community and the community to the citizen. The essence of belonging-
based citizenship may not be found explicitly in the Constitution or statutes, 
but instead may be written on the hearts and in the minds of the community's 
citizens or members. 13 
Though citizenship and membership can be defined as either rights-
based or belonging-based, any type of membership may include aspects of 
both. Indeed, the four examples of membership noted below illustrate this 
point. Each type of membership has a rights-based element and a belonging-
based element, though each element has a somewhat different prominence in 
each type of membership. 14 
B. Illustrations of Membership 
1. Faculty Membership 
For many, faculty membership is a prized possession. After tenure, 
faculty membership comes with the security and enhanced freedom to pursue 
one's academic work. However, faculty membership can be defined largely 
as employment. Being a faculty member comes with certain rights against 
one's school and certain obligations owed primarily to the institution itself 
rather than directly to other members of the institution. Certainly, there may 
be varying fuzzy rights-often tied to seniority-that can be exercised, such 
as a right to a larger office or to a preferred schedule of classes. In addition, 
more serious but still fuzzy obligations may be owed to fellow members of 
the faculty, such as the obligation to mentor junior faculty members or to 
read their draft articles. Yet more fuzzy obligations may be owed to students, 
including the obligation to write letters of recommendation. The rights and 
13. See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REv. 431,432-33 (2006) 
The ideal of the autonomous individual capable of meaningful choice and informed 
decision making is a core operative concept in modern constitutional law, central to 
contemporary accounts of individual liberty and democratic self-government. ... The 
psychological skills of citizenship so defined encompass both heart and mind: basic 
cognitive abilities as well as the integrated psychological capacities for personal self-
reflection and emotional self-mastery. 
!d. 
14. For an old and fascinating discussion of obligations owed to parties in different 
relationships, see BREWER, supra note 2, at 3-8. 
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obligations are fuzzy. However, they relate to duties thought to be owed by a 
faculty member. 15 
The essence of faculty membership, at least from an employment 
perspective, arguably is an arm's length relationship that can be temporary or 
longstanding at the option of the parties to the relationship. Certainly, the 
relationship may be valuable to both sides and may not be defined to the 
letter. However, the relationship may be fairly easily broken, particularly 
before tenure has been granted. Though belonging to a faculty-separate 
from the employment aspects-may be important to some faculty members 
and may tend to bind the faculty member to the institution, a feeling of 
belonging may not be a key component of the underlying relationship. When 
analogized to citizenship, citizenship of this type would reflect a rights-based 
citizenship that exists largely for the convenience of the citizen and the state. 
2. Club Membership 
Club membership tends to be voluntary, though membership in some 
clubs may be hereditary or may be a perquisite of the member's job or 
position. Nonetheless, club membership often will to be unrelated to 
employment and may be less important to one's livelihood than 
employment-based faculty membership. The voluntary nature of the 
association with a club and the usual need to seek club membership before it 
is offered may suggest that club membership is belonging-based from the 
member's perspective. 16 Of course, if the club requires an application and 
acceptance by a significant portion of the club or its leadership, membership 
may also be belonging-based membership from the membership's 
perspective. Belonging-based club membership may trigger fuzzy 
obligations in addition to well-defined obligations of club membership. 
Fuzzy obligations may include the duties to participate in the life of the club 
and to seek new club members who may then become a part of the club's 
lifeblood. Well-defined rights of voting and obligations to pay dues may 
accompany club membership. However, these rights and obligations may be 
15. See SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 6 ("University departments, for instance, routinely 
speak of some of their members as good citizens, by which they mean that they do their share 
of chores such as sitting on dull committees, teaching elementary courses, and attending 
meetings rather than just doing what is often called 'their own work."'). 
16. For an interesting discussion of club membership in the context of deciding whether 
a club is private for discrimination purposes, see Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, 
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
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seen as insignificant in comparison to the less well-defined benefits that 
attend membership. 
Club membership can be analogized to citizenship that stems from a 
desire to belong to a particular group. The desire to belong may be based 
merely on the tangible benefits that may flow from citizenship or from the 
desire to join a group of like-minded people. The process of joining a club 
can be likened to the naturalization process. However, it is unclear that the 
substance of American citizenship-once gained-should be likened to club 
membership. 
3. Church Membership 
Church membership may often begin as involuntary, with the faith of 
parents becoming the faith of children until those children can make 
independent decisions. 17 Once children become adults, church membership 
arguably becomes voluntary. Even so, the inertial pull of religion may make 
church membership less volitional than it appears. Indeed, the belief that 
one's religious views have not changed much over time might be sufficient 
to retain the church membership of one's youth without much thought. 
However, church membership may also be based on belief and affinity. 
Consequently, it may be primarily about belonging in a meaningful sense. 
The belonging may not be based on acceptance by the group to which the 
parishioner adheres. Rather, it ritay be based on the intellectual decision to 
associate oneself with a particular doctrine or belief system that manifests 
itself in the church. 18 
The rights and obligations that surround church membership can be quite 
fuzzy. Certainly, a general but often undefined obligation to support one's 
church may exist as may an obligation to participate in the life of the church. 
The obligations that are owed may not be owed to the other members of the 
church at all, but only to God, the church or the religion itself. There also 
may be few, if any, rights to exercise. 
17. A lack of consent does not necessarily excuse a member from obligations . .See 
BREWER, supra note 2, at 5 ("As I stated, the mere fact of relationship carries obligations, and 
it matters not whether that relationship is one voluntarily entered into, or one in which we are 
placed without our consent."). 
18. For a discussion of issues relating to the desire to associate or disassociate from 
beliefs regarding church doctrine, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr. & Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado 
About Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro 
Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 141 (2010). 
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Considering citizenship through the lens of church membership may be 
illuminating. It may evoke a citizenship that is particularly participatory. It 
suggests the possibility that citizenship can be volitional and can trigger 
generalized obligations that are not tied explicitly to rights but rather to 
beliefs. That suggests a citizenship of belonging that focuses on the 
individual's desire to affiliate with the American polity rather than focusing 
on the American polity's willingness to accept the citizen. This vision of 
citizenship might be analogized to birthright or naturalized citizens who have 
fully contemplated why they wish to be or remain American citizens. 
4. Family Membership 
Family membership is arguably the most complex type of membership of 
those mentioned. It is often based purely on birth and is usually involuntary 
rather than volitional. Exit from the family is possible as a mental or 
emotional matter and may be possible as a legal matter. 19 However, exit is 
not possible as a matter of biology. Few rights of membership may come 
from family membership, though legal rights and obligations may attend 
certain familial relationships and circumstances.20 Similarly, few clear 
obligations may flow from family membership, though there may be fuzzy 
obligations such as an obligation of loyalty to other family members. 
Regardless of how a person fulfills familial obligations, and even if the 
person seeks to "leave" the family, the person may always be considered 
"one of us." 
Of course, there are other non-birthright types of family membership, 
such as membership by marriage or by adoption. Membership by marriage is 
voluntary. Family membership by marriage triggers unclear rights and 
obligations. Of course, questions of acceptance and belonging do exist, and 
exit is possible. Family membership by adoption requires the acceptance of 
the subject based on the decision of the elders of the family. In the case of 
young children, there may be no formal acceptance of the membership. Once 
the adoption decision is made, membership by adoption becomes largely like 
19. However, exit from the family through divorce often does not end obligations to 
other family members. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations 
and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303 ( 1994) (generally discussing obligations in the 
shadow of divorce). Indeed, exit from the family may be much more likely to occur when the 
family is dissolved rather than when a member exits the family. 
20. Illness may create certain obligations and death may create certain rights or 
responsibilities. Indeed, the law may honor some of those obligations. See Family Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 260 I, et seq. (providing unpaid leave for employee to tend to 
certain familial emergencies, including illness). 
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birthright family membership. Exit is possible based on emotional ties or by 
the breaking of legal bonds. However, even those breaks may not be 
permanent or effective. The adopted child may always be deemed a member 
of the family even after explicitly repudiating the family. 
Familial membership is most like birthright citizenship.21 Such 
citizenship is not volitional. It simply is. There is no formal acceptance that 
must occur and the citizen simply is a citizen. Nonetheless, that form of 
citizenship does not necessarily suggest that the citizenship is belonging-
based. Indeed, one may argue that the automatic nature of the citizenship 
guarantees that the citizen is a citizen even if she does not really belong or 
even want to belong in any formal way. 
C. Non-Members 
The focus so far has been on membership and the relationship that 
members have with each other and with the community. However, the status 
of nonmembers in a community is important as well. For nonmembers, the 
value of membership depends on what rights are exercised exclusively by 
members. The content of membership may not depend on whether the 
membership is rights-based or belonging-based. Rather, it may depend on 
how membership rights are defmed. For example, if a nonmember of a 
community is treated just like a member, membership may not matter 
much.22 A family friend who is just like family may be treated as though she 
were a member of the family without regard to formal membership in the 
family. She may have "rights" similar to other family members. Similar 
issues may arise in the context of citizenship. For much of the history of the 
United States, citizenship rights and political rights were separate. Being an 
adult citizen did not mean that one could vote.23 In addition, in the early days 
21. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 5 ("We are not only born into families but also into 
citizenship in a nation, and so long as the relationship springing out of that birth continues 
there are obligations resting upon us as citizens which cannot be ignored. These obligations 
are the responsibilities of citizenship."). 
22. Conversely, it may matter quite a bit. See SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 16 ("The value 
of citizenship was derived primarily from its denial to slaves, to some white men, and to all 
women."). 
23. See id. at 34 (noting that, at times, freedmen were not given the franchise even when 
they were citizens of the jurisdiction). 
496 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 43:487 
of the country, some noncitizens could vote.24 Voting rights were clearly 
treated as something other than citizenship rights.25 
In a community where citizenship is rights-based, the rights owed by the 
state to the citizen may be fairly minimal and narrowly circumscribed. In that 
community, not being a citizen may not matter terribly much because 
membership may not provide much benefit.26 Conversely, in a rights-based 
community where citizenship rights are significant, citizenship may matter 
very much. The key is whether citizens and noncitizens are treated 
differently or treated similarly regarding rights. For example, if nonmembers 
are afforded the same rights to vote or run for office as citizens, and are 
required to discharge the same obligations to pay taxes or serve in the 
military, citizenship and non-citizenship may not appear particularly 
different.27 
As with rights-based citizenship, belonging-based citizenship may come 
with fairly insignificant rights and obligations or may come with fairly 
significant rights and obligations. Whether citizenship tends toward being 
belonging-based depends on how important the non-defined aspects of 
citizenship are, not merely on how many or how few rights and obligations 
attend citizenship. Nonetheless, belonging-based communities may tend to 
have fewer rights that accompany citizenship or membership. If the essence 
of citizenship is belonging-based and few rights come with citizenship, a 
noncitizen may be treated as if he belongs, i.e., as a citizen, even as actual 
citizens are treated as if they do not belong. 
Membership can take many forms and can be viewed as primarily rights-
based, primarily belonging-based or anything in between. 28 There is no 
24. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 216-17 (2007) (discussing distribution of the vote in early 
America). 
25. Of course, the extension of rights to non-citizens may not alter the possibility that 
the rights provided are fundamentally rights for citizens. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 170 ( 1998) ("Surely the fact that Americans may often extend many benefits of our 
Bill [of Rights] to, say resident aliens-for reasons of prudence, principle, or both-does not 
alter the basic fact that these rights are paradigmatically rights of and for American citizens."). 
26. See PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP 81-82 (2008) (noting that the lack of 
rights owed specifically to and duties owed specifically by citizens makes citizenship less 
important or less salient to citizens and non-citizens alike). 
27. See id. at 82 (noting that the obligations and rights of citizens and non-citizens are 
almost precisely the same although that has not historically been the case). 
28. See BREWER, supra note 2, at 3 ("Out of all the relations into which human beings 
enter, or are brought, there spring obligations--obligations resting upon each party to the 
relationship, yet varying in the specific duties imposed with the character of the relationship 
and the place each occupies therein."). 
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clearly correct view of the nature of membership and citizenship. As 
importantly, different citizens may view citizenship differently. Nonetheless, 
citizenship of a particular type may tend to create societies that are more or 
less cohesive or are more or less able to live up to their ideals of civic virtue. 
III. CITIZENSHIP UNTIL THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
A. Founding Era Principles 
The Founding Era did not provide a definitive description of citizenship 
that necessarily tilted toward being either rights-based or belonging-based.29 
Many of the discussions of citizenship that punctuated the Founding Era 
hearken back to a classical vision of citizenship. That vision of citizenship 
suggests that a good citizen is somewhat selfless and works for the common 
good.30 That may tend toward a belonging-based citizenship that focuses on 
civic virtue. Indeed, the Founding Era references to classical citizenship may 
be thought to suggest that many Founders wished for a belonging-based 
citizenship in which moral ties bound the citizen to the new country more 
tightly than laws and statutes. 
However, the Founders recognized that man in his normal state may tend 
toward a selfishness that is inconsistent with sustained civic virtue. 31 The 
classical vision of the citizen being created or molded by the state-an 
assumption of an Aristotelian view of citizenship-did not fit comfortably 
29. It may have been enough for the Founders to focus on the concept of equal 
citizenship for those who were granted citizenship. See JAMES H. KElTNER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 10 (1978) ("The Revolution created 
the status of 'American citizen' and produced an expression of the general principles that 
ought to govern membership in a free society: republican citizenship ought to rest on consent; 
it ought to be uniform and without invidious gradations; and it ought to confer equal rights."); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232 (1991) ("Equality 
was in fact the most radical and most powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution."). 
30. See Robert A. Dahl, Is Civic Virtue a Relevant Ideal in a Pluralistic Society, in 
DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (1996) (describing civic virtue as animating various political 
traditions, including the American political tradition through the American Revolution and 
beyond); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 6 (1992) 
("Leaving the differences aside for the moment, I suggest that both Federalists and anti-
Federalists were concerned with the problem of fostering a sentiment of allegiance from 
which a disposition to undertake civic duties would emerge."). 
31. See SINOPOLI, supra note 30, at 159 ("It is worth remembering that the authors of 
The Federalist considered the active patriotism of the revolutionary era to be the result of a 
'temporary ardor,' not long sustainable in periods of normal politics."). 
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with a Revolution-era vision of a citizenry that creates the state.32 That may 
suggest that the bonds between the state and citizen may only be as strong as 
can be enforced by the state. 33 In addition, there was reason to believe that a 
classical vision of citizenship was not attainable in a country the size of the 
United States. 34 All of this may suggest a practical notion of citizenship that 
is more rights-based than belonging-based. However, rather than focus 
directly on whether citizenship was rights-based or belonging-based, the 
Founders arguably focused more on providing that whatever citizenship was 
provided would be provided equally.35 As will be seen below, equal 
citizenship may not necessarily tilt toward either being rights-based or 
belonging-based citizenship. 
B. The Antebellum Constitution 
American citizenship did not exist before the Constitution was written, 
though there may have been a distinctly American outlook that united many 
of the inhabitants of the several colonies. 36 The Declaration of Independence 
did not create an American citizenry; it united the colonies for purposes of 
war, not nationhood. State citizenship existed in the wake of independence. 
Indeed, state constitutions governed and defined the relationship between the 
state and its citizens and inhabitants. Even though the Articles of 
32. This is contested ground. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn & Susan Dunn, Introduction, 
in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP x (1996) ("There has always been an important strand in the 
liberal political tradition that has resisted the idea that membership in the political community 
requires the subordination of one's own interests to those of others."). 
33. However, the citizen's attachment to the republic may not be static. See Pickus, 
supra note 7, at 64 ("For Publius [of the Federalist Papers], American citizenship meant 
attachment to a common identity that is itself subject to change. He tried to forge a shared 
identity without foreclosing deliberation over the nature of that identity."). 
34. See Dahl, supra note 30, at 2-4 (suggesting that the primacy of civic virtue does not 
work with a large, diverse republic that does not agree of the precise content of the public 
good). . 
35. Of course, even for some of the most equality-minded Founders, none of this 
discussion included free blacks. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE 
AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 133 (2d ed. 2001). 
Because Jefferson could not imagine living in a society in which blacks could claim 
equal rights, he could never comfortably consider emancipation or manumission .... 
Because Jefferson believed free blacks could never be citizens--despite the fact that 
they were citizens in the states immediately north and south of Virginia-he assumed 
they would become an exploited and ungovernable mob. 
!d. 
36. See WOOD, supra note 29, at 8 (1991) (discussing the American Revolution and 
implementation of an American vision of culture and society). 
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Confederation created a United States, it did not create the United States in a 
way that created American citizenship.37 Until the Constitution was drafted, 
there was no need to contemplate the content of American citizenship 
because American citizenship did not exist. Given that state citizenship 
clearly predated national citizenship, the question is not whether American 
citizenship came before state citizenship, but when it eclipsed state 
citizenship in relevance and what were its essential features. 38 
Citizenship became a national issue when the Constitution created a 
nation and transferred the right to make new United States citizens to 
Congress through its control over naturalization.39 The Constitution may 
reflect the nature of American citizenship.40 However, it did not provide a 
specific content of American citizenship.41 Though the Constitution said little 
about the content of citizenship, it required that citizens be treated equally by 
the states. That may not illuminate the content of American citizenship, but it 
suggested that American citizens must be treated with a reasonable level of 
decency everywhere in the country. 
Though the Constitution has little to say about the content of citizenship, 
it mentions citizenship a number of times. The text of the antebellum 
Constitution did not provide definitive evidence that American citizenship 
should be viewed as rights-based or belonging-based. It arguably is a legal 
document that simply provides rights, and says nothing about the nature of 
37. See WISE, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that under the Articles of Confederation "while 
State citizenship necessarily followed at once to the inhabitants of the colonies, respectively, 
upon the acknowledgement of their independence, no citizenship of the United States was 
recognized or even existed."). 
38. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166--67 (1875) (noting that state citizenship 
predated U.S. citizenship); see also GETIYS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that, since the 
Fourteenth Amendment, national citizenship is "paramount and dominant" to state 
citizenship). Interestingly, other types of citizenship also predated national citizenship. See 
WISE, supra note 2, at 13-17 (discussing the citizenship of the Northwest Territory, which 
predated national citizenship). 
39. See WISE, supra note 2, at 17 ("When the Constitution was ratified by nine of the 
States composing the old confederacy, and not until then, was there an actual and real 
citizenship of the United States, however much the term may have been theretofore loosely 
employed."). 
40. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 4 ("Before one asks what it means to be an American, 
one must ask who is an American. Unlike other treatments of American national character, it 
takes the legal status of citizenship as a mirror of the community. In this view, nothing is more 
constitutive of the community than its membership practices."). 
41. See LOUELLA GETIYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1934) 
("When the United States Constitution was adopted, it contained no definition of citizenship 
although it made use of the term 'citizens.' Furthermore, it recognized not only citizens of 
each state but also citizens of the United States."). 
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citizenship. Nonetheless, the Constitution-like any document-may reflect 
certain principles that are not explicitly stated in it. However, the 
Constitution does not speak definitively about its orientation on citizenship. 
The Constitution's equality-based text could support either a rights-based or 
a belonging-based citizenship. 
I. Naturalization 
Citizens of the several states also became citizens of the United States 
when the Constitution became operative. However, once passed, the 
Constitution granted Congress the sole power to determine who can become 
a U.S. citizen.42 That text merely provides that non-citizens can become 
citizens on whatever terms Congress decides. It does not provide much 
reason to believe that citizenship is necessarily belonging-based or 
necessarily rights-based. Congress may structure the naturalization process 
so that the only people who are accepted as citizens are those who 
"belong."43 However, providing the power to Congress to do so does not 
necessarily mean that citizenship is belonging-based or rights-based. 
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
The Constitution's Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause suggests 
that states are ordinarily supposed to treat citizens of sister states the same as 
their own citizens.44 This might appear to suggest that American citizenship 
is inclusive. However, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was borrowed 
in substance from the Articles of Confederation.45 Consequently, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause arguably is focused more on how states 
ought to treat free people rather than on the substance of national citizenship. 
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish an 
uniform rule of Naturalization."). 
43. See Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven 
Months And A Hundred Yards Short Of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS I 
(2008) (discussing the history of United States naturalization law). 
44. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2. The Constitution also has a privileges or immunities 
clause embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I. However, 
that clause does not create rights. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170 (1875) ("The 
Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we 
must look elsewhere."). It provides another protection for rights that already exist. See AMAR, 
supra note 25, at 182. 
45. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV ("[T)he free inhabitants of each 
of these states ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several states[.]"). 
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Nonetheless, continuing a tradition of the equal treatment of sister state 
citizens and transforming that necessarily into the equal treatment of U.S. 
citizens from sister states, may provide some hint regarding the substance of 
U.S. citizenship. The requirement that states treat all U.S. citizens as they 
treat their own when regulating sister-state citizens might be thought to 
suggest a belonging-based citizenship. Conversely, that states had to be 
required by constitutional text to treat sister state citizens like their own 
citizens may suggest that being an American citizen does not necessarily 
mean that the citizen will be treated as belonging to the polity by individual 
states. That might suggest a rights-based citizenship. 
3. Citizenship Requirements for Holding Office 
There are various citizenship requirements for holding specific federal 
offices.46 United States Representatives must be citizens for seven years 
before serving.47 United States Senators must be citizens for nine years 
before serving.48 The president must be a natural born citizen.49 The various 
limitations on which citizens can hold certain offices suggest a particular 
vision of belonging. By dividing some citizens from others with respect to 
who can hold office, the Constitution seems to suggest that mere citizenship 
may not suggest full belonging. Indeed, the requirement that the president be 
a natural born citizen suggests that there will always be some limits on the 
nature of belonging for those who do not enjoy birthright citizenship. Using 
the circumstances of one's birth as a qualification suggests a somewhat 
intriguing way of determining fidelity to the United States. Put differently, 
there may always be a bit of doubt about whether a foreign-born U.S. citizen 
is sufficiently American to be trusted to run the country. The limitations on 
holding certain federal offices arguably suggest that citizenship may not only 
be belonging-based, but that the belonging must be of a certain type. 
4. Diversity Jurisdiction 
The Constitution mentions citizenship with respect to the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. The federal courts have jurisdiction over various matters 
46. Some have argued that holding office is a citizenship right. See Chambers, supra 
note 24, at 215 n.27. 
47. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2. 
48. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 3. 
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1;. Chin, supra note 43, at 5-14 (discussing natural-born 
citizenship) 
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in which the citizen-parties are from different states.50 Without federal 
jurisdiction, a state court would have jurisdiction over a matter in which it 
could presumably favor its home state litigant. However, as with the 
privileges and immunities clause, the existence of diversity jurisdiction says 
more about concerns regarding how states treat citizens from fellow states 
than it does about the substance of American citizenship. 
C. Dred Scott v. Sandford, American Citizenship and Black Citizenship 
Dred Scott v. Sandfor~ 1 defined and denied African American 
citizenship before the Civil War.52 The questions surrounding free blacks and 
the American polity revolved around citizenship, membership and inclusion. 
Dred Scott conflated them and rejected all of them for free blacks. Dred 
Scott made clear that African American citizenship was non-existent.53 Not 
only did Chief Justice Taney make clear in that opinion that free blacks were 
not citizens, he argued that free blacks were ill-suited to citizenship in 
general and American citizenship in particular.54 Taney stated that free 
blacks and slaves could only become American citizens through 
naturalization processes that had not and likely never would materialize. The 
Dred Scott Court;s position was simple: Free blacks were not and could not 
be a part of the polity absent specific action affirming their citizenship. 55 
Dred Scott arguably supports both a belonging-based and a rights-based 
vision of citizenship. Taney suggested that citizenship is about belonging and 
being accepted as a member of the American citizenry by the American 
citizenry.56 The Chief Justice explained that Indians and Europeans could 
become American citizens through naturalization and become part of the 
"us" that constituted the American citizenry by giving up their prior political 
50. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
51. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
52. However, the question regarding the citizenship status of free blacks did not first 
arise in the I 850s. See Randall Kennedy, Dred Scott and African American Citizenship, in 
DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP I 05-06 (1996) (noting the unresolved controversy accompanying 
the Missouri Compromise regarding whether free blacks were citizens of the United States); 
Maier, supra note 3, at 56 ("The question soon arose whether the freed blacks were citizens of 
the United States. It was not readily answered; indeed, that issue prompted the attorney 
general's expression of puzzlement in 1862, and was only definitively resolved in 1868 with 
the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
53. For a discussion of Dred Scott of particular relevance to this essay, see Chambers, 
Dred Scott, supra note 24. 
54. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. at 407. 
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and tribal commitments and aligning themselves with the American people.57 
Conversely, the Court suggested that blacks could never belong to the 
American polity in the way that a citizen needs to belong to the American 
polity.58 However, the Dred Scott Court relied on a rights-and-obligations-
based vision of citizenship to explain why free blacks had never been 
considered citizens. Taney relied on rights ostensibly never given to blacks 
(such as the right to vote) and duties ostensibly never owed by blacks to the 
state (such as the obligation to bear arms to defend the state) to explain why 
blacks had never been a part of the citizenry.59 Taney did not adequately 
explain how his rights-based vision of citizenship meshed with the facts that 
some non-citizens voted and some defended the United States by bearing 
arms.60 Nonetheless, Taney focused much of his citizenship argument on 
rights and obligations.61 
Taney had no need to determine the nature of American citizenship when 
rejecting African American citizenship. Nonetheless, Taney provided a 
glimpse of his thoughts on American citizenship and slavery. As importantly, 
he provided justification and precedent for treating claims of African 
American citizenship as rudely and as narrowly as possible. The Dred Scott 
Court created a special outsider status for free blacks in the midst of a society 
governed by a Constitution that arguably suggests that free native-born 
people, e.g., American Indians, should be treated tolerably well, and possibly 
as citizens. The issue post-Dred Scott became whether the treatment of free 
blacks would change in the wake of the Civil War to square the group's 
treatment with the notions of freedom and liberty arguably extant in the 
Constitution. 
57. /d. at 403-04. 
58. See Chambers, Dred Scott, supra note 24, at 213. 
59. Seeid. at215-17. 
60. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 92 (noting that even participation in political life is not 
and has not always been fully restricted by citizenship status, though noting that much alien 
voting was based on a precitizenship status that was based on declared intention to become a 
citizen). 
61. Taney's structure could not easily explain women's citizenship. Women were 
citizens and were clearly part of the body of American citizens. They belonged. However, the 
Court noted that women neither exercised all of the rights of citizenship nor owed all of the 
duties to the state that male citizens owed. Thus, women were citizens, even without receiving 
some of the rights male citizens were owed and without discharging some of the obligations 
that male citizens owed as citizens. Taney simply asserted that women's citizenship was a 
fact. See Chambers, Dred Scott, supra note 24, at 216. · 
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D. Civil War, Slavery and African American Citizenship 
In the immediate post-Civil War period, the discussion of African 
American citizenship became particularly prominent.62 For many in power, 
the issue was not whether African American citizenship was to exist, but 
how. The outlawing of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment was, for some, 
all that was required to create African American citizenship. Slavery's end 
created a large group of free people born in the United States who could 
become citizens. Their freedom alone should have been enough to make 
them citizens, according to some.63 ·Others believed that the abolition of 
slavery merely created additional free blacks. Assuming that the Dred Scott 
Court's denial of citizenship to free blacks was not essentially reversed by 
the Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment did not automatically make free 
blacks and newly freed slaves citizens. Indeed, many Southern states 
indicated that the regulation of long-free blacks and newly-freed slaves 
would continue in the form of newly passed Black Codes. The nature of 
those codes made clear that many would not accept free blacks as citizens.64 
However, the Black Codes helped trigger the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.65 That law commanded what the Thirteenth Amendment did not, 
that former slaves born in the United States were citizens of the United 
States.66 In addition to providing citizenship, the law cataloged a number of 
contract-based and property-based rights clearly deemed incident to 
citizenship. 67 
62. For a thorough discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment see Douglas L. Colbert, 
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (1995); Jacobus 
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 
171 (1951). 
63. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1401 (2002). 
64. See JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY 5 (2006) (arguing that the 
institution of black codes suggested that "Southern whites could not easily view blacks in 
fundamentally new ways" after the Civil War). 
65. /d. at 5-6. 
66. See JAMES H. KElTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, 
at 341 (1978) (noting that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was "based explicitly upon the principle 
that citizenship derived from birth within the allegiance and entitled persons enjoying the 
status to basic rights throughout the nation."). 
67. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, §I, I 4 Stat. 27 ( 1866). 
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power ... shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
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Neither the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment nor the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act proves that African American citizenship was specifically rights-
based or specifically belonging-based in the immediate aftermath of the Civil 
War. The Thirteenth Amendment's passage arguably suggests that 
citizenship is belonging-based. Many who worked to pass the Thirteenth 
Amendment appeared to assume that the end of slavery would herald the 
beginning of African American citizenship without any specific edict. 
Simply, all Americans would do the right thing, accept former slaves and 
free blacks as citizens and move on. The attempt to have African Americans 
treated as citizens without a specific edict telling other citizens to do so, 
certainly may suggest that those who pressed for the Thirteenth Amendment 
believed that American citizenship is belonging-based, i.e., that American 
citizenship is about being "one of us." 
However, the 1866 Act's need to assert explicitly the citizenship of 
former slaves in the wake of the refusal of some to accept it may suggest that 
American citizenship is not necessarily belonging-based. The Act's specific 
provision of the right of African American citizens to be treated as the equal 
of white citizens does not prove that American citizenship was rights-based. 
Rather, it suggests that in the wake of the passage of the Black Codes, 
African American citizenship needed some explicit protection, at least in the 
short run. However, the need to protect rights that would seem to flow 
clearly and directly from citizenship may suggest that African Amencan 
citizenship will be treated as rights-based even if the nature of American 
citizenship is belonging-based. 
IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN THEW AKE OF THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
By setting free blacks apart as a group that could never belong to the 
American polity, Dred Scott guaranteed that free blacks and those acting in 
their interest would have to fight for African American citizenship and 
citizenship rights.68 The Fourteenth Amendment superseded the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act and granted citizenship to all native-born black Americans, 
making African American citizenship a part of the Constitution.69 The 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white 
citizens[.] 
!d. 
68. See Glazer, supra note 8, at 97 (noting that native black Americans have been 
treated noninclusively more than other minority groups). 
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
506 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:487 
Amendment also guaranteed equal citizenship.70 The Fifteenth Amendment 
followed a few years later, barring the provision of the franchise based on 
race and formally making African Americans men full voting members of 
American society.71 In whole, the Reconstruction Amendments-the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-guaranteed that free 
blacks were to be full members of the American Republic and would be 
treated as such by the individual states.72 The amendments gave real life to 
the basic promises of freedom and equality found in the Constitution, but that 
had been obscured by the interpretation of other language in the Constitution. 
Indeed, to some, the amendments merely recognized rights that should have 
already existed. 73 
The amendments did not define what being a citizen meant, could not 
guarantee that blacks would be accepted as citizens-members of the republic, 
and could not ensure that African American citizenship would be belonging-
based.74 Indeed, that the newest native-born Americans had to have their 
citizenship confirmed explicitly by amendment may suggest that such 
citizenship was grudgingly acknowledged by some and was not in the nature 
of belonging. As a result, African American citizenship arguably was rights-
based in that such citizenship would extend only so far as the Constitution 
specifically allowed. Indeed, how the rights of citizenship have been 
70. See Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 
OR. L. REv. 895, 905-06 (2006). 
What are the radical ideas that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment? ... Each citizen 
is seen as an independent and equal economic and political actor, and government is 
to be available and responsive to each of them equally. In this phrase, too, is captured 
the idea that membership in American society is not tribal. ... There are no legal 
ranks among the people of such a republic. 
!d. 
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
72. The Reconstruction Amendments did not fully resolve the issue of the full equality 
for all citizens, as different groups of citizens had different sets of rights for many years after 
the Civil War. For example, restrictions on voting based on sex were lawful until the 
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
73. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of 
the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REv. 777, 790 (2008) ("Like many radical Republicans in 
other states, Louisiana activists viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as recognition of a set of 
claims to citizenship that had always been legitimate, not simply as the conferring of 
citizenship on men and women of color at the moment of ratification."). 
74. See BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at 85 (noting a minimalist reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that guarantees citizenship to some but says little if anything about the content of 
citizenship). 
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structured and how African Americans have been treated in the wake of the 
Reconstruction Amendments arguably confirms that. 
A. Efforts to Belong 
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was a significant step in fully 
integrating African Americans into the American polity. The process has 
been a struggle.75 Certainly, there have been successes. However, law has 
been used to stop the full inclusion of African Americans in all areas of the 
national community as well as to foster that inclusion. That law had to be 
used to force inclusion may suggest that fellow citizens viewed African 
American citizenship formally, as rights-based rather than belonging-based. 
Plessy v. Ferguson16 is an important case in understanding the structure 
of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in Plessy was a 
Louisiana law that required that different races sit in separate rail cars while 
traveling. Homer Plessy challenged the constitutionality of the law, and lost. 
Though the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that all citizens would enjoy 
the same citizenship rights, the Court took a narrow approach in defining 
citizenship rights and evaluating their content. Rather than provide a right to 
equal dignity in public accommodations, the Court conceptualized the right 
claimed as a social right to sit next to white Americans or to ride in a rail car 
reserved for white Americans.77 In defming the claimed right as it did and 
rejecting it, the Plessy Court suggested that African Americans, and by 
extension all Americans, had certain narrow rights triggered by the 
Constitution, but no more. In addition, the substance of Plessy suggested that 
the Fourteenth Amendment and citizenship were not necessarily about 
belonging to the community as a whole. 
Brown v. Board of Education18 essentially overruled Plessy. Brown may 
be thought to be quintessentially about belonging. It could have been, but 
75. It is possible that gaining citizenship rights is always a struggle. See SHKLAR, supra 
note 2, at 15. 
Because exclusion was so much more common and so much easier than 
inclusiveness, citizenship was, moreover, always something that required prolonged 
struggle, and this also has molded its character. Citizenship so gained lost much of its 
urgency once it was attained. The years of denial have left their paradoxical marks 
upon this constitutional right. 
!d. 
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
77. See Scott, Public Rights, supra note 73, at 800 (noting that Plessy focuses on the 
enforcement of dignitary rights rather than a claim of "social equality"). 
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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arguably was not. The Supreme Court's position was that separate but equal 
was inherently unequal.79 However, that merely proved that the government 
failed in its requirement to provide equality with respect to a good that it 
provided. The essence of Brown was not necessarily that segregation was 
wrong because the races were separated. Though Brown could be interpreted 
to make the point that citizens should not be separated based on race, the 
decision was based on the specific harm that was caused by the separation 
(suggesting a rights-based remedy) rather than from the fact of the separation 
(suggesting a belonging-based remedy).80 
In one of the Supreme Court's recent school desegregation cases, 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District,81 school 
districts were required to litigate an attempt to make sure that their schools 
were reasonably diverse. In that case, two school districts were admonished 
to stop attempts to racially balance schools using race.82 Regardless of one's 
vision of the rightness or wrongness of the outcome, the vision of citizenship 
evidenced in the case appears rights-based. The right vindicated was the right 
to avoid racial classification, even if that racial classification was arguably 
necessary to ensure a certain level of racial diversity among a student body. 
That is, inclusion was deemed secondary to the right not to be racially 
classified. The nature of that vision of citizenship is not one of a citizenship 
that necessarily encourages or creates strong bonds among the citizen, all of 
her fellow citizens and the state. The vision of citizenship suggested in 
Parents Involved arguably is one that views the citizen as an individual with 
well-defined rights to be asserted and honored, even possibly to the 
detriment of the goals of the community in which the citizen lives. 
The point of mentioning these cases is not to suggest that the Court 
wrongly or rightly decided any of them. That would require far more 
nuanced and lengthy analysis of the cases. Rather, it is to suggest that there 
may be little evidence that citizenship consists of anything other than the 
rights that can be gleaned directly from the Constitution. That is the essence 
of a rights-based citizenship. The cases could have been about community 
and belonging, but they are not. They are about rights and precisely how 
those rights will be interpreted and enforced. That lack of consideration 
regarding the community as a whole suggests a citizenship that may be 
marked more by rights and obligations than by belonging. 
79. !d. at 495. 
80. !d. at 492 (noting that the key to the case is the effect of segregation on public 
education). 
81. 551 U.S. 70 I (2007). 
82. !d. at 747-48. 
2013] SLAVERY, FREE BLACKS AND CITIZENSHIP 509 
B. Voting 
Voting was not a citizenship right when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified. However, it has continued to expand to the extent that it can now be 
considered a citizenship right. The expansion of the right may suggest the 
right is about making sure that everyone belongs, or it may merely relate to 
the acceptance that equal citizenship requires equal voting rights. 
Nonetheless, the need to fight for voting rights suggests a tilt toward a rights-
based citizenship rather than a belonging-based citizenship. 
Protection for the right to vote began with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and continues in various forms today. Section two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was an attempt to protect against race-based disfranchisement. 83 
The section provided a penalty of the loss of representation for states that 
disfranchised voters based on race.84 That could be seen as an attempt to 
encourage states to welcome African American citizens as voters and full 
participants in the polity. However, that attempt was preempted when the 
Fifteenth Amendment banned the use of race in providing the right to vote. 
The Fifteenth Amendment provides a right for male former slaves to vote on 
the same grounds as other male citizens. 85 The protection was welcomed and 
necessary. However, even with the Fifteenth Amendment, the practical 
disfranchisement of African American citizens continued for nearly a 
century. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed to implement the 
Fifteenth Amendment fully.86 The Act has provided actual protection for the 
right to vote since its passage. 
The protection of the right to vote of African Americans dovetails with 
the continued expansion of the right to vote through the Twentieth Century. 
The Constitution has been amended through the years to eliminate 
restrictions on the right to vote. Through the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and 
Twenty-sixth Amendments, the Constitution has become a backdoor 
guarantee of voting rights to citizens. 87 Voting has become the quintessential 
right of citizenship. However, voting has not necessarily shaped the nature of 
83. For a discussion of section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chambers, 
Colorblindness, supra note 63, at 1417-18. 
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2. 
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, et seq. (2012). 
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXVI. 
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citizenship.88 A citizen is allowed to vote whether or not citizenship is based 
on belonging. As voting becomes a citizenship right that is provided to all 
citizens absent justification and is denied to noncitizens, it merely marks the 
content of the citizenship right-what the state must provide to the citizen. It 
does not indicate that the citizen necessarily is an integral part of the 
community. Indeed, when groups of citizens must fight for the right to vote, 
it is possible that voting has become a mere citizenship right that all can 
exercise rather than proof that the citizen belongs to the community in which 
he votes. 
C. The Nature of African American Citizenship 
The Reconstruction Amendments repudiated Dred Scott regarding the 
citizenship of free blacks. The Thirteenth Amendment arguably hinted at an 
inclusive citizenship with the abolition of slavery. The Fourteenth 
Amendment guaranteed citizenship to free blacks. The Fifteenth Amendment 
provided a stronger form of citizenship-based rights for male former slaves. 
However, the issue of inclusion may yet remain separate from the issue of 
citizenship. Indeed, citizenship may be defined through the Reconstruction 
Amendments merely as a set of rights and obligations owed to citizens by the 
country. If citizenship means no more than that, the notion of citizenship as 
belonging may have been lost-if it ever existed-in part as a direct result of 
how citizenship was addressed in the years surrounding the Civil War. 
In the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment, free blacks were made 
citizens. However, that citizenship may have been and may be formal and 
rights-based. It is unclear that the fact of African American citizenship 
means that all citizens are treated as if they belong in the polity. When 
citizenship is more about belonging, the formal rights and obligations fade 
and the informal ones come to the fore. Little reason exists to believe that 
post-Fourteenth Amendment citizenship is belonging-based. There is a 
difference between being a citizen and being one of us. The issue is not the 
substance of citizenship rights, it is whether the relationship between the 
citizen and the nation is structured as rights-based or belonging-based. The 
Reconstruction Amendments formally clarified the issues, but arguably did 
88. However, it is possible that the expansion itself changes the nature of the Founders' 
democracy even if it does not tell us precisely how. See SINPOLI, supra note 30, at 170 
("Moreover, each time we have expanded the electorate by including previously excluded 
groups, such as blacks and women, we have effectively suggested that a liberal-democratic 
system can tolerate a larger, more diverse civic body than either Madison and Hamilton 
thought possible."). 
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not resolve the deeper question of whether citizenship made free blacks a 
true part of the citizenry, rather than merely recognized free blacks as a 
segment of the citizenry. 
In the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments, African American 
citizens have had to fight for basic citizenship rights. Unfortunately, 
resistance to the existence of African American citizenship stemming from 
racialized slavery of the type endorsed in Dred Scott guaranteed that 
claiming African American citizenship would be a process of demanding 
rights rather than accepting the benefits of citizenship that all citizens are 
thought to enjoy. Dred Scott provided the need to base African American 
citizenship on the Constitution's text. However, the Constitution is a legal 
document. A resort to a legal document to find the substance of a right may 
be problematic because the process of finding the right can lead directly to a 
rights-based citizenship. Of course, if the process of finding the content of 
citizenship requires a close reading of a legal document to find specific 
support for a claim to a right, the process is likely to lead to a rights-based 
citizenship. However, if the point of grounding rights in text is to search for 
general principles to use to extrapolate general citizenship rights or rights 
flowing from belonging, a text-based hunt for the content of citizenship is 
not necessarily destined to produce a rights-based citizenship. 
The need to ground African American citizenship on constitutional text 
was understandable both because Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion 
suggested that blacks could never be accepted as citizens and because the 
precise contours of American citizenship rights were unclear. However, 
basing African American citizenship rights on text had an additional effect. It 
guaranteed that African Americans and other Americans were going to need 
to fight for equal citizenship rights, right by right. If the Constitution's text 
does not indicate that the citizen enjoys a particular right, then no such right 
exists. That approach almost guarantees that African American citizenship 
would be viewed as a less robust rights-based citizenship rather than as a 
more robust belonging-based citizenship.89 Simply, Dred Scott and its 
treatment of free blacks tended to move us toward rights-based citizenship, 
rather than belonging-based citizenship. 
89. The nature of American citizenship appears to be changing, though almost certainly 
not based on a single cause. See SPIRO, supra note 26, at 6 ("The rights and obligations 
attendant to citizenship have also attenuated over the course of American history. Citizenship 
both demands and privileges less than it once did. The declining legal significance of the 
status betrays and reinforces the waning intensity of bonds among members."). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the Founding, Americans have tried to develop principles that 
would lead us to a more perfect union.90 In theory, citizenship is the 
foundation on which that attempt rests. However, the nature of American 
citizenship was not clear at the Founding and remains somewhat unclear. 
Whether American citizenship is supposed to be rights-based with a focus on 
the rights owed to citizens by the community and obligations owed by 
citizens to the community, or belonging-based with a focus on making sure 
that every citizen is thoroughly connected to the community through implicit 
connections to fellow citizens and the community that augment any formal 
rights and obligations that attend citizenship status is not clear. Constitutional 
developments over the past century and a half have not resolved the issue.91 
Regardless of how American citizenship is supposed to be conceived, it 
appears that the Dred Scott decision has acted as a headwind against moving 
toward a belonging-based citizenship by shaping the manner in which 
African American citizenship rights are conceived and enforced. The Dred 
Scott Court provided language and precedent that structures African 
American citizenship as rights-based. The Court essentially guaranteed that 
African American citizenship would necessarily have to be created by and 
imposed on the country by specific edicts grounded in the text of the 
Constitution. In addition, it ensured that African American citizenship would 
be narrowly construed and would have to be defended at all turns by pressing 
for specific rights. That process was required even in the wake of the 
destruction of slavery and the ratification of a Fourteenth Amendment that 
promised equal citizenship and an expanded citizenry. 
The treatment of citizenship claims by African Americans arguably 
reflects a fragile, static, and formal relationship among those citizens and the 
polity. If American citizenship in general comes to reflect a fragile, static, 
and formal relationship, it may well be because at some point in the past, 
Americans were reluctant to view citizenship as belonging-based because 
that would have required that the former slaves and free blacks be welcomed 
90. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
91. It may be that the rapid expansion of citizenship has altered society in ways that are 
difficult to measure merely by reference to citizenship rights. See Douglas Klusmyer, 
Introduction, in FROM MIGRANTS To CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP lN A CHANGING WORLD 1 (T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmyer eds., 2000) ("The admission of immigrants with 
cultural heritages and historical experiences different from those of their host societies 
inevitably changes the fabric of these societies and requires a complex process of mutual 
adaptation."). 
2013] SLAVERY, FREE BLACKS AND CITIZENSHIP 513 
into a society that had, up to that point, not viewed them as fundamentally 
belonging. That reluctance may have been sufficient to stop American 
citizenship from developing into a belonging-based citizenship. However, 
that reluctance had significant support from the Court's opinion in Dred 
Scott. That opinion almost certainly helped limit the bonds among citizens 
and between citizens and the state, and may have led to a weaker republic 
than would have existed otherwise.92 If so, this is just one more legacy that 
can be laid at the footsteps of that notorious case. 
/ 
92. It may have had an effect on the drift that has appeared to have occurred. See SPIRO, 
supra note 26, at 162. 
This perspective confirms the general perception across American society that 
America is losing its sense of special social, cultural, and political purpose and that 
Americans themselves feel less bonded to each other. Those who describe this drift 
invariably look to restore the intensity of the national tie. Call it patriotism on the 
right, civic duty on the left-both point in the same direction, toward the formerly 
elevated place of the nation among our many forms of association. 
/d. 

